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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALINA CREEK IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent_, 
vs .. 
STATE OF UTAH; WAYNE D. 
CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah; ABRAHAM IRRI- Case No. 
GATION COMPANY; CENTRAL 9430 
UTAH WATER COMPANY; 
DELTA CANAL COMPANY; 
DESERET IRRIGATION COM-
PANY; MELVILLE IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, and W. C. Cole, 
Sevier River Water Commissioner, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON REHEARING 
The issue before this Court in the original appeal 
and the real issue of the Petition for Re-hearing made 
by defendants and appellants, is the interpretation of 
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the term "minimum rights" as used in the Cox Decree 
at Page 230. 
The rights of numerous water users detailed in the 
Cox Decree are by specific wording designated as 
"minimum rights." The appellants seek to have this 
Court change the description of "minimum rights" in 
the Cox Decree by adding the ambiguous phrase "one 
flow right" as being a minimum right. No right in the 
Cox Decree is described as "One Flow". Such a phrase 
implies there should be "Two Flow" or "Three Flow" 
rights. That such a confusion has never been permitted 
by this Court is illustrated by the following principles 
and facts. 
The concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion 
agree with the majority opinion "that there is no ambi-
guity in the language of the Cox Decree". The majority 
opinion holds, with reference to the question of ambi-
guity of the language: "Since tins is stated in clear 
and unambiguous language, we have no choice but to 
fallow the mandate of the decree." The concurring 
opinion agrees by stating: "Said decree simply and 
clearly said in 1936 what the main opinion, in its third 
paragraph, said it said." The dissenting opinion begins 
by stating: "We are not _persuaded that there is any 
ambiguity in the Cox Decree in providing that a user 
has a "maximum and a minimum" right. That phrase 
should require no further explanation." 
The majority opinion states: 
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"There is no statement in the (Cox Decree) 
which supports or justifies the order of the State 
Engineer that the maxiinum rights of prior ap-
propriators 'may not .he satisfi~d until a~l .other 
direct flow rights, designated either as minimum 
rights or given only one flow right, and those 
listed on pages 195 to 197 of said decree' are 
fully satisfied." 
Analyzing the exception to "first in time, first in 
right" at Page 230 of the Cox Decree, the first part 
of the sentence clarifies that all water-rights are to be 
measured to the user or owner according to their respec-
tive dates of priority, indicating that the water-rights 
of prior priority date take to the exclusion of the later 
dated priority rights. Then the language in question is 
inserted as an exception to this general rule. The excep-
tion, however, is specifically limited by the language 
to those water-rights that were decreed as "maximum 
and minimum" rights in the Decree. It is only that 
kind of rights that are included in the exception. 
There is no hint in the language that any other type 
of rights were being affected by the language in ques-
tion other than in situations "where a maxiinum and 
minimum right is herein decreed." To construe that 
"one flow rights" are included within the meaning of 
the language is clearly adding to the language some-
thing that is not there and is not a matter of interpreting 
the language as written. The only purpose of the pro-
vision is to provide in those situations where maximum 
and minimum rights. have been decreed that the mini-
mum rights of all subsequent maximum and minimum 
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appropriators be satisfied before the maximum rights 
of the prior maximum and minimum appropriators may 
be filled. There is no reference to "one flow" rights. 
Nowhere in the Cox Decree can one find a definition for 
or a concept of "one flow". The attempt of appellants 
and the State Engineer to include these "one flow" 
rights in the term "minimum rights", where it happens 
to serve the purpose of appellants, is clearly contrary 
to all rules of construction found in the law to date. 
"Minimum right" is mentioned three times in the 
clause in question. It is an impossibility to include "one 
flow rights" within the meaning of "minimum right" 
the first two times that term is used. The term is used 
the third time without making reference to any other 
rights than those referred to when it was used the 
first two times. "Minimum rights" as used the third 
time had reference to the very same rights, i.e. "where 
a maximum and minimum right is herein decreed." 
Even if respondents were to concede for argumen-
tative purposes that the term "minimum right" is used 
the third time in a general way, so that it possibly could 
include other rights such as the ambiguously described 
"one flow" rights, the rules of construction announced 
by the Utah Supreme Court which preclude the giving 
of an enlarged meaning to the term "minimum rights". 
The Utah Supreme Court in Donahue v. Warner 
Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp._, 272 Pac. (2d) 177, 
184 ( 1954), was called on to interpret the meaning of 
a phrase. One party contended the phrase had a general 
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meaning and therefore included the activity in question~ 
Judge Crockett, writing the opinion for the Court, 
rejected the argument as a matter of construction, stat-
ing the rule of construction to be : 
" ... It is a well recognized rule of statutory 
construction where general terms are used fol-
lowing specific ones, the general must be under-
stood in the light of and as characterized by . the 
specific, and are limited to things of like kind 
" 
This rule of construction has been consistently 
applied by the Utah Supreme Court. For instance, in 
the case of Memorial Gardens of the Valley v. Love_, 
300 Pac. (2d) 628 (1956), one of the parties argued 
that a term in a statute was a general term and its mean-
ing should be expanded to include the item in question. 
Judge Crockett, speaking for the majority of the Court, 
held that the rules of construction prohibited the giving 
of expanded meanings to general terms---when the gen-
eral terms are used with reference to specific items. The 
rule of construction was set forth as follows: 
"Such general terms cannot be given a literal 
meaning independent of the context in which 
they are used. 'They must be understood in the 
light of and as characterized by the purpose of 
the statute, and viewed in relation to the entire 
context. When specific terms are followed by 
general terms, the latter are limited to things of 
like kind." 
The same rule of construction was again applied 
by the Utah Supreme Court in th ecase of Anderson 
v. Utah County_, 368 Pac. (2d) 912. 
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Minimum rights have been specifically defined and 
designated in the Cox Decree wherever awarded, there-
fore, according to the above stated rules of construction, 
the term "minimum right" (as used the third time) 
which appellants contend includes "one flow" rights 
could not include rights other than those described, 
defined and designated as minimum rights in the Cox 
Decree. 
An additional guide to interpreting terms of a 
statute or decree was announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Perris v. Perris, 202 Pac. (2d) 731. One of 
the parties in that case contended that the term 
"charges" had a general meaning and included the item 
in question .. The Court rejected the argument, based 
on the following stated rule of construction: 
"Noscitur a sociis, prevails. Hence, the mean-
ing of particular terms in a statute may be 
ascertained by reference to words associated 
with them in the statute .... It is also a familiar 
policy in the construction of terms of a statute 
to take into consideration the meaning naturally 
attaching to them from the context, and to adopt 
that sense of the words which best harmonizes 
with the context. . . . " 
The term "minimum right", which appellants con-
tend includes "one flow" rights, refers to and is asso-
ciated in the sentence with the term "maximum and 
minimum rights", with the term "minimum right" de-
scribing rights awarded in the Cox Decree. Therefore, 
pursuant to the above stated rule of construction the 
meaning of "mini1num right" as used the third time in 
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the sentence is li1nited to 1ninimum rights of that group 
of appropriators whose water right is designated a 
"minimum right" by the Cox Decree. 
The term "one flow" rights was conjured by the 
State Engineer apparently to enlarge upon "minimum 
rights" so designated in the Cox Decree and include 
something less than all other rights but including certain 
rights described in the Cox Decree other than those 
rights in the Decree described as "maximum and mini-
mum". He excludes storage rights and implies some-
thing less than all other rights were to be included, but 
further clouds the issue by including A to F rights. 
No water user has any way of knowing whether the 
ter1n "one flow" rights includes all rights other than 
those described as "maximum" and "storage rights" 
or whether the designation is the least of all flow rights 
a user has acquired or possesses; or is the "A" right 
of the A to F or A to L rights, or any other of the 
many rights described in the Decree. Is "one flow" 
limited to rights described as a flow of a certain amount 
of cubic feet per second as contrasted with those rights 
described in acre feet and those describe as storage 
rights? There is no reference in the Cox Decree to any 
class of rights termed as "one flow" rights. If this term 
is added to the meaning of 1ninimum right, additional 
litigation will be necessary to define what is meant by 
"one flow rights". Therefore, the result of accepting 
appellants' contention or affirming the State Engineer 
would be to cause more confusion rather than to settle 
a matter. 
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The term "one flow" rights is an anomoly. No 
matter how it is defined, it brings about incongruous 
results. 
For example, Abraham Irrigation Company, Cen-
tral Utah Water Company and Deseret Irrigation 
Company, appellant water users, serve designated irri-
gated lands. Each is awarded in the Decree numerous 
rights, all of which come to it after storage of the water 
in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir. Some of these rights 
are designated in the Cox Decree at Page 196 as fol-
lows: 
Class "A" 
Abraham Irrigation Company 59 c.f.s. 
Deseret Irrigation Company 74 c.f.s. 
Central Utah Water Company 12.4 c.f.s. 
Class "B" 
Priority 
1874 
1874 
none 
Abraham Irrigation Company 5 1874 
Deseret Irrigation Company 10.7 c.f.s. 1874 
Class "C" 
Central Utah Water Company 12.5 c.f.s. none 
Class "D" 
Abraham Irrigation Company 4285.6 acre ft. 1890 
Deseret Irrigation Company 5714.4 acre ft. 1890 
Class "E" 
Central Utah Water Company 5.8 c.f.s. none 
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This designation of the rights shows, first, that the 
combination of all of a company's rights are a maximum 
right; that as to Central Utah Water Company, the 
Class "E" flow right without priority is its least right; 
that the 5 c.f.s. of Abraham and 10.7 c.f.s. of Deseret 
Class "B" are their least rights. But what designation 
does one give the combined 10,000 acre feet Class "D" 
right? This is obviously a storage right, but what is 
there to designate one right a flow right and one a 
storage right, when all such are received after storage 
in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir? 
Also the question arises as to what computation or 
regulation could be made of the water in the river as of 
any given day when a right is expressed in acre feet. 
Could an acre foot be a flow fight? 
The adding of "one flow rights" to the meaning 
of "minimum rights" forces the Court to add other 
words by way of d~fining the term added. The problem 
becomes so complex when the term "one flow right" is 
applied to the A to L rights up river, the designated 
maximum and minimuin rights upstream and on the 
tributary San Pitch River that an insertion of such a 
new phrase or concept would take years of study to 
evaluate. 
As pointed out in the main Brief, counsel for the 
State Engineer conceded that such a concept would 
make nugatory all rights designated as maximum rights. 
Also as pointed out in our original Brief, counsel for 
appellants conceded the designation of their rights 
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as A to F was only another way of expressing maximum 
and minimum. 
The provisions on Page 230 of the Cox Decree 
should be enforced as it is written. Neither "one flow 
rights" nor any other rights should be added to the 
unambiguous language. Appellants' contention should 
be rejected and the Court should affirm the interpre-
tation given by the majority opinion. Inasmuch as none 
of the appellants have rights designated as minimum 
rights, the order and judgment of the District Court 
is a correct adjudication of the rights of the parties to 
this action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wilford M. Burton 
Henry D. Moyle, Jr. 
Barrie G. McKay 
Attorneys for Respondents 
720 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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